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Abstract
This paper estimates a structural model of the employment decision of
the ﬁrm. Our establishment level data displays an extreme degree of rigidity
in that employment levels are largely constant throughout our sample. This
can be due to the fact that establishments face large shocks but also large
adjustment costs, or alternatively that they incur no adjustment costs but
that shocks are negligible. Given our identifying assumptions, we ﬁnd that
rigidity is due to adjustment costs and not to the shock process. We further
ﬁnd that these costs reduce the value of the ﬁrm as much as 5%. Finally,
small ﬁxed costs of adjustment have a large impact on entry and exit job
ﬂows.
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11 Introduction
This paper uses a standard neoclassical model of the decision of the ﬁrm to esti-
mate adjustment costs in a panel of ﬁrms operating in markets with large rigidities.
Using an explicit structural approach allows us, conditional on the model, to dis-
entangle the contribution of the structure of adjustment costs from that of the
stochastic process driving the ﬂuctuations in its employment.
Our model is close to that of Cooper, Haltiwanger and Willis (2004) and is
constructed to explain employment observations from a panel of small establish-
ments operating in Portugal. The Portuguese labor market is an interesting case
study because of its high levels of job protection which result in very high ﬁr-
ing costs. Collective dismissal rules involving a substantial amount of red tape
apply to the dismissal of as few as two or ﬁve employees depending on the size
of the establishment. These and other similar rules are responsible for the fact
that the Portuguese labor market emerges as the most regulated in Europe in all
existing rankings of indexes of employment protection (e.g., OECD, 1999; Varejão
and Portugal, 2007). In this sense, the evidence we present and the estimates we
obtain may be thought of as upper-bounds for the corresponding results in other
countries.1
One key observation from this data is that of extreme levels of inaction, deﬁned
by ﬁrms having the same number of workers in many consecutive periods. Indeed,
at quarterly frequencies, the magnitude of job ﬂo w si nP o r t u g a li sm u c hl e s st h a n
in other countries. Identiﬁcation of what exactly lies beneath this inaction is fun-
damental for the understanding of labor market rigidity. This translates into the
identiﬁcation of the parameters of a structural model of the employment decision
of the ﬁrm. To put it simply, a ﬁrm may decide not to change its labor force be-
cause its demand does not ﬂuctuate, or because even though demand ﬂuctuates, it
has large costs associated with hiring and ﬁring. The policy implications of these
two alternatives are of course very diﬀerent.
We solve the optimization problem of our artiﬁcial ﬁrm and use a simulated
method of moments approach to the estimation of the structural parameters we
are interested in. Our estimated model does a good job of matching the data and
we ﬁnd that quadratic adjustment costs impose a loss of about 5% of the value of
the ﬁrm, while ﬁxed costs of adjustment impose a loss of 0.65% of the value of the
ﬁrm. More importantly, while the loss of value is moderate, the impact of these
costs on the dynamics of the model is very large, as we can gauge by simulating
the estimated model shutting down adjustment costs. This also shows that the
observed rigidity is not likely to be driven by the shocks, but rather due to the
costs of adjustment.
1For a comparison with the U.S., see Blanchard and Portugal (2001).
2Our results are in line with those presented by Hammermesh (1989) who uses
high frequency data to ﬁnd that ﬁrms display a high level of rigidity in response
to small shocks, but quick adjustment to large shocks in the sense that in our
estimated model, inaction following large shocks is more frequent after larger than
that following small shocks. In a broader sense, our results are consistent with the
notion that, with stringent ﬁring costs, labor adjustment is shaped by permanent
product demand shocks, but not by transitory ones (Blanchard and Portugal,
2001).
2D a t a
The data used in this study comes from the Inquérito ao Emprego Estruturado
(IEE) which is a quarterly survey with detailed information on job and worker
ﬂows at the establishment level. The surveys is run by the Portuguese Ministry of
Employment. Establishments of all sizes and in all industries are included in the
IEE dataset.2 T h es a m p l ei sd r a w nf r o mt h eu n i v e r s eo ft h er e s p o n d e n t st ot h e
1990 spell of the Quadros de Pessoal, an annual survey which covers all establish-
ments with at least one wage earner. Micro and quarterly (or more frequent) data
are essential for studying the dynamics of factor adjustment because aggregation
(spatial or temporal) smoothes away any nonconvexities present at the plant or
ﬁrm levels (Hamermesh, 1993).
The probability of units with fewer than 100 employees being selected to the
IEE sample is inversely related to the size of the establishment. Above that thresh-
old, establishments are selected with certainty. The sample is statistically repre-
sentative for three-digit industries (as deﬁned by the SIC code), region and size
class. For this purpose, seven regions - ﬁve in mainland Portugal and the islands
of Madeira and the Azores - were considered and six size classes were deﬁned. The
IEE data used here span over twenty quarters, from the ﬁrst quarter of 1991 until
the last quarter of 1995. On average, 6,954 establishments respond to each spell
of the survey.
A detailed description of this data can be found in Varejão (2003). We divide
our panel in size categories determined by the initial size of the ﬁrm - the size
of the labor force in the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst reported observation. In this paper we limit
our attention to very small ﬁrms, those that report an initial number of workers
of ten or less, and use only the ﬁr m st h a tr e p o r ta l lt h e2 0c o n s e c u t i v eq u a r t e r s
of information. This delivers a sample of 538 ﬁrms and 10760 observations.3 The
main reason why we focus on small establishments is because of the large rigidity
2Only Agriculture, Fisheries, Public Administration and Household Services are excluded.
3An appendix, available upon request, details the data treatment and the characteristics of
the sample.
3we observe in them. In particular they should provide an extreme case of the
importance of ﬁx e dc o s t so fa d j u s t m e n t . I na d d i t i o n ,b yf o c u s i n go nv e r ys m a l l
establishments we reduce dramatically the computational burden of our estimation
procedure. We are convinced, nevertheless, that the scope of our analysis can be
extended, mutatis mutandis, to larger establishments.
3 Empirical Moments
As in any other simulated method of moments exercise, one needs to choose care-
fully (revealing) identifying empirical moments to be matched by the model.
3.1 Relevant moments from the size distribution
The ﬁrst set of observations we are interested in are the cross sectional averages
and cross sectional standard deviations of three ﬁrm speciﬁcm o m e n t s-m e a n ,
standard deviation, and ﬁrst order serial correlation - of the stock of employment:
Sample moments μcs (μ) σcs (μ) μcs (σ) σcs(σ) μcs (ρ) σcs (ρ) ρcs (μ,σ)
N = 538 5.042 2.769 0.795 0.897 0.711 0.275 0.4536
The mean (5.042) is used to center our model - a calibration moment - so is not
a moment used in the estimation exercise. The average standard deviation (0.795)
and serial correlation (0.711) are moments used to help estimate the properties
of the stochastic shock in our model (as well as the other parameters, of course).
The cross sectional covariances between ﬁrm level means and ﬁrm level standard
deviations, ρcs (μ,σ) is a useful moment to describe size implications.
3.2 The action distribution
We want to study the hiring and ﬁring behaviour of our ﬁrms. In our sample,
the graphical depiction of the distribution of the 19 × 538 = 10222 (quarter-ﬁrm)
observations, by the size of variation in the labor stock, ∆Lt = Lt − Lt−1,i s : 4
4The number of observations for ∆L =[ < −3,−3,−2,−1,0,1,2,3,> 3] are respectively
[25,42,144,885,8160,771,136,33,26].







and one key property of this sample is the very high percentage of observations
where employment remains unchanged (79.8%). The other important property of
this sample is the fact that most non zero observations are of plus or minus one
single worker, along with the smooth declining nature of the distribution. This
may suggest that ﬁxed costs may be of lesser importance. One ﬁnal characteristic
of this curve is the asymetry between -1 and +1. This may be due to the fact that
aggregate employment falls over our sample.5
3.3 The inaction distribution
We also want to take advantage of the knowledge of how long and how often
ﬁrms remain inactive. We look at episodes of inaction. An episode (a sequence)
of inaction is the consecutive number of periods (quarters) a ﬁrm has the same
number of workers. The histogram of inaction sequences is:
Inaction duration 1 2 3 4 567 ... 17 18 19
Number of spells 458 296 1 8 81 1 79 46 87 3 1 81 57 9
This will prove to be useful information to help gauge the importance of ad-
justment costs and the frequency of the shocks.
3.4 Job ﬂows
Job ﬂows are standard measures in Labor Economics. Here we measure the obser-
vations of adjustment, ∆Lt 6=0 , times the size of adjustment, when positive and
when negative (providing the total number of jobs created or destroyed), and then
just report the count of total number of observations, the total number of zeros,
5If we take the subset of ﬁrms that grow over the sample, they have more observations of
∆L =+ 1 , than observations of ∆L = −1.
5the total number of positives (observations of job creation) and the total number
of negatives (observations of job destruction).
Number of ﬁrms Job creation Job destruction N Zero + ∆Lt − ∆L
538 1322 1448 10222 8160 966 1096
Here, approximately 12% of observations have job creation, and 15% have job
destruction.
3.5 Worker flows
One additional information potentially revealing is the measure of entry and exit
worker ﬂows. Sometimes - not often - the stock of employment remains unchanged
but there was actually entry and exit. Here we report the number of observations
where entry is zero (8902), where exit is zero (8751), and where all (∆Lt,E,X)
are zero.
Number of ﬁrms Job flows=0 Entry =0 Exit =0 Entry = Exit =0
538 8160 8902 8751 7874
How much of our inaction in the stock is then associated with inaction in ﬂows?
The answer is 7874/8160 = 0.965, or over 96 percent.
What about non zero entries and exits? As we can see around 96.7% of obser-
vations of entry and exit are either of zero or one worker:
538 012 3 > 3
entry 9325 1092 238 59 46
exit 9180 1225 240 74 41
3.6 Aggregate employment
Over the observation period, aggregate employment was declining as seen in the
graph:












We now propose a model of the employment decision of the ﬁrm to try and capture
the rigidity as well as the action described above. The model follows Cooper, Halti-
wanger and Willis (2004). Capital and other inputs are assumed to be maximized
away. The proﬁtf u n c t i o no ft h eﬁrm is given by
Πt (At,δt,L t−1)=AtL
α
t − wLt − C (Lt−1,L t) − F (Mt 6=0 )
where revenues AtLα
t are concave in labor, 0 <α<1. Employment obeys the law
of motion Lt = Lt−1−δt+Mt,w h e r eδt is the number of quits.6 Accounting for quits
allows the establishment to downsize via two distinct routes: ﬁring workers and
incurring in labor adjustment costs or waiting for the worker to leave voluntarillly,
avoiding ﬁring costs.7 Quits is a non negative iid random variable deﬁned over a
small set of integers [0,1,2,...,δ
max]. Finally, Mt is the net change in the stock of
labor which can be negative.
The shock At - a demand or technology shock - has two components which we
label persistent and transitory, At = AP
t AT
t . The transitory component follows
a ﬁrst order stochastic process, AT





,w i t hxT
t = ρxT
t−1 +  t,w h i c h
is discretized into a ﬁrst order Markov process using Tauchen’s method. The
permanent component is a persistent Markov process aimed at matching cross
sectional dispersion, and which we detail below.
6Quits are here deﬁned in a broad sense. In essence, quits in the model account for natural
friction such as that generated by retirements, voluntary exits, etc.
7This second option appears to be of relevance in high job protection countries such as Italy,
Spain, or Portugal (Bover et al., 2000).












F (Mt 6=0 )=F
+ (Mt > 0) + F
− (Mt < 0).
The ﬁrm pays ﬁxed costs if it hires or ﬁres anyone, but adjustment costs at
the ﬂoor level only happen if it has less or more people to work with than it did
the previous period, and so it has to adapt its processes to a diﬀerent number of
bodies. Fixed costs are split in two, distinguishing the events of hiring and ﬁring.
We interpret ﬁxed costs of ﬁring as being mainly regulation induced, whereas ﬁxed
costs of hiring are likely to be related to training and disruption costs.
The quadratic costs speciﬁcation is adapted from the investment literature.
The diﬀerence between what matters for ﬁxed costs versus quadratic costs intro-
duces a trade-oﬀ in the employment decision of the ﬁrm. On one hand the ﬁrm
wants to have the same number of bodies as in the previous period not to disrupt
the work ﬂow which carries the quadratic costs, but on the other hand, as technol-
ogy (or demand) shocks induce it to hire or ﬁre workers, ﬁxed costs induce large
adjustments conditional on taking action.
The cost structure used here, with ﬁxed costs extending the usual quadratic cost
framework is known in the literature on labor and capital adjustment. Irrespective
of its particular interpretation above, the main property is that it is standard and
reasonably general given its ﬁxed and quadratic components, and in this paper it
is enough to describe the data very closely.
There is no time to build in the model. Even though labor is a state variable,
and therefore a stock variable, new hiresb e c o m ep r o d u c t i v ei m m e d i a t e l y .W ec a n
think of a model where new hires go through a training process and only become
productive in the following period, but we do not go that route here. Regarding
the information set, the ﬁrm observes (Lt−1,A P
t ,A T
t ,δt), and then decides on its
current labor force Lt.
This formulation of the problem encompasses shutdown and reopening of the
establishment. The state space for employment in a set of non-negative integers
and therefore includes zero. The costs of closing down and reopening the estab-
lishment are treated as any other adjustment costs of employment. In this sense,
because the distribution of shocks is ergodic, the ﬁrm never dies in the model. In
the data the ﬁrm exists already and does not die, and in the model, entry into the
market is not deﬁned.8
8It is possible to model entry and exit explicitly and then model the sample selection procedure
that generates the actual data, but that would be another paper.
85C a l i b r a t i o n
We need to select some moments that will prove useful to help the model match
the data both in the time series and the cross section dimension. Some parameters
of the model are calibrated and some are estimated.
The number of quits is an iid random variable on the set of integers δ ∈
[0,1,2], with discrete space density p(δ)=[ 0 .96,0.03,0.01]. This has an expected
value of around 0.05 quits per quarter, which helps to match the evidence that
there is very little movement in entry and exit. Note that we cannot identify quits
in the data. Exit in our model is given by
EXt = δt − Mt × (Mt < 0)
a n de n t r yi sg i v e nb yENt = Mt × (Mt > 0),w h e r eδt are quits and Mt are net
hires or ﬁres. Note that this is the correct deﬁnition of exit for the model to match
the data. In the data entry and exit can occur at the same time whereas that is
ruled out in the model. Our data shows that most observations have zero exit,
which is replicated by this process. About 99% of observations of exit are of zero,
one or two workers. Therefore our state space for quits is limited to [0,1,2].
The discount rate for the proﬁts of the ﬁrm is 1.5% to match our observations
of quarterly data. We have no reliable data on proﬁtability of these establishments,
which is information necessary to pin down alfa, so we ﬁxt h ewage arbitrarily at
w =0 .5, and we assume a value of α =0 .7 which is a curvature found in similar
models and in the investment literature.9
Our data has a strong cross sectional dimension. The average number of work-
ers for ﬁrms with up to 5 initial workers is 3.1576, and the average for the ﬁrms
with 6 to10 initial workers is 7.5104. There are respectively 315 ﬁr m sw i t hu pt o
5w o r k e r sa n d2 2 3w i t h6t o1 0w o r k e r si nt h e i rﬁrst reporting quarter, totalling
538 ﬁrms.
Employment means cannot be used for estimation as the state space of the
model is calibrated using these values. We model the size distribution through
the persistent shock (a quasi ﬁxed eﬀect) using a Markov process with four points
in the support, [2,5,8,10], and symmetric transition matrix ΠFE with 0.985 in
the diagonal. The support of the model is constructed by imposing these four
center points for L, and then inverting the deterministic steady state expressions
to impose the four "centers" for the conditional expectation of the A shock.10
We need also to account for the aggregate decline in employment.W e
do this via an additional Markov process with support TR =[ 0 .5,0.75,1],a n d
9Cooper, Haltiwanger and Willis estimate α to be between 0.66 and 0.86.
10We center the model by selecting ¯ A so that ¯ L is true in the deterministic steady state. When











These two markov processes interact to generate our data. In the estimation
part, we use ten panels of artiﬁcial data of the same size as our actual data panel,
and average our resulting moments. But each of our artiﬁcial data panels is gener-
ated initializing 172 ﬁrms at L =2 ,2 0 2ﬁrms at L =5 ,1 3 2ﬁrms at L =8and 32
ﬁrms at L =1 0 , which is an approximate reproduction of our initial distribution of
ﬁrms in the data. All our ﬁrms also start their time series at the high state in the
TR process so that this process then simply generates the evolution of aggregate
employment.11
The discrete state space for L is a cut from the natural numbers from 0 to 50,
reﬂecting our data which has information on the number of workers in a ﬁrm, and
not on hours worked. The number of points in the state space for the conditional
(transitory) markov process of A is set at 11.
6M a t c h i n g m o m e n t s
The remaining parameters, (ρ,σ,γ,F −,F+), are estimated to get the model to ﬁt
the data as closely as possible, minimizing a quadratic distance measure explained
b e l o w .B u tw h a td a t ad ow ew a n tt om a t c h ?H e r ew ef o c u so nt h ef o l l o w i n gv e c t o r
of moments, X:
Sample Moments μcs (σ) μcs (ρ) ∆L = −1 ∆L =0 ∆L =+ 1 I(1) EX(1)
Mean 0.795 0.711 885 8160 771 458 1225
Std deviation 0.039 0.012 33.275 73.943 31.504 27.300 44.356
As conventional, the ﬁrst two moments are the cross sectional mean of ﬁrm
speciﬁc ﬁrst order standard deviation (0.795)a n dﬁrm speciﬁc serial correlation
(0.711)o f t h e stock of labor. These are measures of the standard deviation and
serial correlation of the conditional shock process. These measures isolate from the
eﬀect of heterogeneity across ﬁrms. A measure of such heterogeneity is contained in
cross sectional standard deviations in these same ﬁrm speciﬁc moments. However,
we have already calibrated the heterogeneity, and so we focus on the moments and
parameters we have yet to identify.
11This is still an idiosyncratic shock, but the matrix is skewed so that there is more density at
the bottom in the long run. This is a pragmatic solution to the problem posed by the aggregate
employment movement.
10The third, fourth and ﬁfth moments are used to capture the dynamics of ∆Lt.
The number of zeros (8160) are expected to track the magnitude of both ﬁxed costs
and quadratic costs.12 The sixth and seventh moments are added as overidentifying
restrictions. They contain potentially diﬀerent information from the previous ones.
458 is the number of times we have single periods of inaction (the ﬁrst element in
the inaction distribution): of the 8160 periods of zero adjustment, 458 of those are
preceded and succeeded by action. 1225 is the number of observations where exit
is just one worker.
6.1 Model Estimates and bootstrapping.
The artiﬁcial numbers on our moments are averages of 10 replications with artiﬁcial
data. We use bootstrapping on the actual data to generate the variance matrix
of the moments. Bootstrapping is done by sampling ﬁrms, not observations. So,
when one ﬁrm is picked, all 20 observations of that ﬁrm enter the bootstrap draw.13
Estimation is done using the simulated method of moments procedure following
Ingram and Lee (1991). We search over θ =( ρ,σ,γ,F +,F−) to ﬁnd the combi-
nation that minimizes a quadratic form, Q. For a given parameter vector θ0 we
generate artiﬁcial data and compute the artiﬁcial counterpart Y (θ0) of our actual
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The outcome of this quadratic form, Q(θ
∗), has a chi squared distribution
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of elements in X minus the number
of parameters to be estimated, and this diﬀerence is two. The 5% conﬁdence level
12In the absence of ﬁxed costs, depreciation would be irrelevant, and any positive or negative
action would be a result of shocks. As it is, asymetric ﬁxed costs can play a part, but once we
account for the fall in aggregate employment, this ﬁxed cost asymetry is largely irrelevant.
13We construct a variance matrix for these moments by bootstrapping with one thousand
draws.
11stands at the value of 5.99.14 This then provides an overidentifying restrictions
test on the model.
Finally we need to compute the variance covariance matrix of the estimator.
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The calculation of the matrix of derivatives B is done numerically with 1%




We obtain the following estimates for the structural parameters, (upper bound on)
standard deviations, and measures of closeness:











The remarkable characteristic of these estimates is that ﬁxed costs are very
small (F− =0 .0245 is about 15% of the monthly wage, or 5% of the quarterly
wage which is 0.5). The statistic Qabs i st h es u mo ft h ea b s o l u t ev a l u eo ft h e
percentage deviations between the actual data moments and the artiﬁcial data
moments used in estimation.
7.1.2 Matching moments
14A chi squared with one (two) degree of freedom has a 10% threshold of 2.706 (4.61) and a
5% one of 3.841 (5.99).
12Overall, our model does reasonably well in matching our moments, being oﬀ be-
tween 1.88% and 9.86%, being on average only 5.4% oﬀ.15
Sample Moments μcs (σ) μcs (ρ) ∆L = −1 ∆L =0 ∆L =+ 1 I(1) EX(1)
Data 0.795 0.711 885 8160 771 458 1225
Model 0.827 0.743 803 8346 728 449 1104
Diﬀerence (%) 3.99 4.52 9.27 2.28 5.62 1.88 9.86
A ﬁrst set of moments illustrates how well the model does:
Sample Moments μcs (μ) σcs (μ) μcs (σ) σcs (σ) μcs (ρ) σcs (ρ) ρcs (μ,σ)
Data 5.042 2.769 0.795 0.897 0.711 0.275 0.453
Model 4.980 2.560 0.827 0.840 0.743 0.285 0.289
Diﬀerence (%) 1.23 7.55 3.99 6.35 4.52 3.64 36.2
From a calibration perspective this is a reasonable success and only the cross
sectional correlation between means and variances is substantially oﬀ.T h i s m o -
ment shows that the model still lacks cross sectional variability. But the rest of the
moments are a reasonable success. However, from a structural estimation point
of view we do not have a success. We have two overidentifying restrictions which
puts the Q statistic threshold at around 6, and we get a Q value of 30.
7.2 Implications for non-estimated moments.
7.2.1 The inaction distribution.
The model generates the following distribution of inaction sequences (average of
10 replications):
Inaction Duration 1234 5 6 7 ... 17 18 19
Data 458 296 188 117 94 68 73 ... 18 15 79
Model 449 274 165 134 95 66 50 ... 89 1 1 7
and we can see the plot of the two series:
15What makes this outcome more reasonable is that a broader set of 22 moments is oﬀ by
10.94% on average.









The predicted frequency of duration of inaction is roughly in the ballpark.
7.2.2 The action distribution
The corresponding action distribution is also well determined:
∆Lt < −3 −3 −2 −10 12 3 > 3
Data 25 42 144 885 8160 771 136 33 26
Model 21 31 119 803 8346 728 154 20 0
7.2.3 The distribution of entry and exit
The model does also a good job matching entry and exit, again short of the tail
of the distribution. The zeros (ﬁrst column) are less than 2% oﬀ, but the ones
(second column) are over 10% oﬀ. Nevertheless the pattern is similar to the data.
It is also understandable that the tails should be harder to ﬁt simply because they
are thinner (have less observations).
Worker ﬂows 01 2 3 > 3
Entry
Data 9325 1092 238 59 46
Model 9491 945 283 39 1
Exit
Data entry 9180 1225 240 74 41
Model exit 9372 1104 232 31 21
147.2.4 The distribution of quits
Not surprisingly, quits behave according to the Markov probabilities speciﬁed
above.16 The number of periods with quits equal to zero, one or two, and to-
tal quits, is computed for the average of ten artiﬁcial panels as:
Quits 01 2 Total
Model 10309 340 112 563
and we see that quits represent only about one third of total exits.
7.3 Welfare analysis
We know that small non-convex costs can change behaviour signiﬁcantly. The
value function allows us to measure the losses associated with them. We take our
estimated model, and run a version of it with diﬀerent adjustment cost parameters
set at zero to evaluate the gains from having a ﬂexible labor market. The gain is
measured on the value function. The numbers below report the value function gains
from eliminating costs measured over entire panel: our 10760 artiﬁcial observations
generate 10760 values of the value function, V (At,δt,L t−1),a n dt h ev a l u e si n
the table are the averages over these 10760 realizations. The ﬁrst value is the
benchmark without shutting down any adjustment costs and the last column shuts
down all the costs.
V 0 F− = F+ =0 γ = F− = F+ =0
V 52.3594 52.6756 55.2606
V −V 0
V 0 0.0 0.60% 5.54%
The biggest gain comes from eliminating quadratic adjustment costs. Fixed
c o s t sa r es o m e w h a ta s y m m e t r i cb u t( n o ts h o w nh e r e )h a v ea l m o s tt h es a m es m a l l
impact on the value of the ﬁrm.
B u tm o r ei m p o r t a n ti sp e r h a p sw h a th a p p e n st ot h em o d e lw h e nt h e s et h r e e
parameters are set at zero. The number of observations of zero adjustment falls
from 8160 to 2654 and there is substantial action outside of +1 and -1. This
suggests adjustment costs are fundamental for the understanding of inaction since
we already introduced substantial persistence and rigidity in our treatment of
heterogeneity, and that component of the model is still present. Going back to
our identiﬁcation exercise mentioned above, rigidity is a result of costs rather than
shocks: without the adjustment costs most of the rigidity disappears. In fact, even
if we shut down only the ﬁxed costs, the number of observations of zero adjustment
16Moderate modiﬁcations of the quit probabilities do not disturb the results.
15falls to 7317, which is a substantial change. This additional action appears as 1263
observations where Lt −Lt−1 = −1, and 1252 observations where Lt −Lt−1 =+ 1 .
This is a very signiﬁcant change in the behaviour of the model. The number of
observations with Lt − Lt−1 6=0increases by more than 50% from 10222 - 8346
=1 8 7 6u pt o2 9 0 5w h e nw es h u td o w nt h eﬁxed costs alone, and the ﬁxed costs
are very small in value, and have an accordingly small impact on the value of the
ﬁrm.
∆Lt < −3 −3 −2 −10 1 23 > 3
Data 25 42 144 885 8160 771 136 33 26
Model 21 31 119 803 8346 728 154 20 0 ½
γ =0
F 6=0 781 460 871 597 4541 465 811 515 757
F− = F+ = 0 11 31 158 1263 7317 1252 163 19 0
γ = F− = F+ = 0 895 335 1027 1331 2654 1310 1031 348 870
Our benchmark model is the best ﬁt we could obtain. It contains a speciﬁcation
for adjustment costs which stems from the investment literature, in that it attaches
quadratic costs to rates of change, and then scales it by a factor to set costs at the








This type of function implies that the cost of adjusting any given number of
workers falls with ﬁrm size. For larger ﬁrms, costs are smaller relative to revenues,
even if the adjustment cost function are simply
(Lt − Lt−1)
2 ,
but with the function above even more so.




2 + φabs(Lt − Lt−1)+FC
First, we estimated only (γ,φ) jointly, keeping all other parameters at the
values estimated in our benchmark. We obtained (γ,φ)=( 0 .052861,0.0022781),
with a J statistic of 57. With this structure, shutting down linear costs - while
keeping all other coeﬃcients at the estimated values - generates a J statistic of
59.7, while shutting down quadratic costs generates a J statistic of 20516. Other
experiments and estimations with linear costs suggested also that the model with
quadratic costs is far superior in matching the data.




2 + F(M 6=0 )
and we obtained (γ,F)=( 0 .0488,0.0254), with a J statistic of 53.9. This esti-
mated model generated 8098 zeros of ∆L. Shutting down quadratic costs here
generated a J statistic of 23526 and 4469 zeros, while shutting down ﬁxed costs
generated a J statistic of 2156 - an order of magnitude smaller that 23 thousand,
but still quite high - and a number of zeros of 5889.
It is useful to emphasize why quadratic costs generate most of the zeros in our
model. It is still the case that ﬁxed costs are the component that generates zeros,
whereas quadratic costs generate density around zero. However, in this model,
because of the discrete nature of the state space, and because of the small size
of the establishments we are studying, adjusting a single worker is already a big
adjustment. Therefore, the quadratic part of adjustment costs is responsible for
m o s to ft h ez e r o s .W ee x p e c tt h a tt h i sp e c u l i a r i t yw i l lf a d ei fw et a k et h em o d e lt o
larger establishments, and that for those, quadratic costs will generate density of
adjustment around zero, while ﬁxed costs generate density at zero. Nevertheless,
these counterfactual experiments just shown suggest it is not the fact that we have
as a m p l eo fs m a l lﬁrms that produces these results of very small ﬁxed costs. We saw
that the ﬁxed costs, despite being small still have a strong eﬀect on the dynamics
of the model. But more than that, it is the fact that the action distribution has
a smooth normal looking density that suggests ﬁxed costs are just a part of the
story. There are no fat tails in the distribution of ∆L, and fundamentally, there
is a smooth declining distribution of net changes in employment, where there
are signiﬁcant numbers of ∆L = ±1, and that implies we must estimate small
ﬁxed costs. Fixed costs tend to eliminate density at ∆L = ±1.T h i s o u t c o m e
is interesting also because it stands in stark contrast with the ﬁndings of Rota
(2004), using data which has exactly the same pattern.
It is appropriate to note here that our identiﬁcation of the impact of shocks
versus costs is conditional on the model written (as in any exercise). We could
have imposed that there are no adjustment costs and simply allow proﬁts to be
the intratemporal quantity Πt = AtLα
t −wLt. Given our assumed value for wages
and alfa, our data on L immediately implies data on the shocks. The exercise then
would be to recover the process for the shock. However, this leaves us as ignorant
as we started, and the stochastic process we would recover would be something
very strange indeed.
177.4 Fitting the model to larger ﬁrms
One ﬁnal exercise we performed was to put the predictive capacity of the esti-
mated model to the test of seeing how well these parameters fare in replicating
the behaviour of the sample of ﬁrms which report between 11 and 20 workers in
their ﬁrst quarter. We must modify other components of the model, such as the
heterogeneity part of the shock process, to accommodate the wider state space.
But other than that, everything else remains the same.17
The model does a good job of matching a wide variety of moments expect for
the correlation between ﬁrm mean and ﬁrm standard deviations of the stock of
employment, ρcs (μ,σ):
Sample moments μcs (μ) σcs (μ) μcs (σ) σcs(σ) μcs (ρ) σcs (ρ) ρcs (μ,σ)
Data 14.334 3.994 1.838 1.447 0.713 0.238 0.162
Model 14.447 3.585 1.949 1.245 0.621 0.237 −0.144
Larger ﬁrms have less volatility of L, mostly because adjustment is less costly
for larger ﬁrms in this functional form. Not surprisingly, this suggests the cost
parameters estimated for the smaller ﬁrms are less able to deliver the dynamics of
slightly larger ﬁrms, so that some additional treatment of heterogeneity is needed,
perhaps experimenting with making adjustment costs more proportional to the size
of the ﬁrm is needed to replicate a wider panel. Still, the model does reasonably
well.
The model is also reasonably on target matching the number of zeros in the
a c t i o nd i s t r i b u t i o n .B u ti ti sab i to ﬀ on the rest of the action distribution. The
distribution of observations by size of variation in the labor stock, ∆Lt = Lt−Lt−1
is:
∆Lt < −3 −3 −2 −10 123 > 3
Data 70 67 234 811 3024 538 181 58 71
Model 68 127 421 600 2741 459 444 147 42
7.4.1 Re-estimating the model
One way to shed a better light regarding the eﬀect of ﬁrm size on our estimates is
to reestimate the model for this subpanel of 266 ﬁrms between 11 and 20 workers.18
17Details of our results can be seen in the appendix, available uppon request.
18We changed the trend process to be equivalent to the trend process used in the smaller ﬁrms,
and we changed the distribution of quits to [0.85, 0.10, 0.05], to adapt to the distribution of exit.
These are rule of thumb changes, not estimated parameters, although they have a large impact
on the result.
18We did that with the following results.
Sample moments μcs(σ) μcs (ρ) ∆L = −1 ∆L =0 ∆L =+ 1 I(1) EX(1)
Data 1.838 0.713 811 3024 538 498 1128
Model 1.572 0.708 821 3076 538 552 1100
Diﬀerence (%) 14.50 .71 .31 .70 1 1 2 .5
where once again we do a fair job of matching the data.
The estimated parameters are
Sample ρσγ F + F− Qabs Q
11 to 20 workers 0.1202 0.0927 0.5891 0.0285 0.0227 0.317 19.03
1t o1 0w o r k e r s 0.1181 0.1095 0.4760 0.0269 0.0245 0.374 30.5
and the interesting feature of these parameters is that they are very similar to our
earlier estimates. In particular there is no big change in ﬁxed costs, even though
with an average ﬁrm size almost three times bigger the eﬀects of quadratic and
ﬁxed costs must be much better disentangled at zero.19
The ﬁt of the action distribution is quite good except for the tails. Again,
what we ﬁnd is that ﬁxed costs are small, and it is the fact that we have smooth
distributions, rather than the small size of ﬁrms that makes the model estimate
small ﬁx e dc o s t s .T h i so fc o u r s ed o e sn o tm e a nﬁxed costs are without impact as
we saw above. For this sample, setting ﬁxed costs to zero delivers the following
action distribution shown in the bottom row.20
∆Lt < −3 −3 −2 −10 12 3 > 3
Data 70 67 234 811 3024 538 181 58 71
Model 22 54 285 821 3076 538 230 25 3
F± = 0 21 62 323 1196 2181 1003 238 27 3
8C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we use the simulated method of moments to estimate a simple struc-
tural model of the employment decision of the ﬁrm. Under reasonable assump-
tions, this methodology allows us to separately identify the driving shocks from
the adjustment cost parameters in our model.
19This also has to do with the choice of modelling the ﬁxed costs in terms of net and gross.
20Hammermesh (1989) ﬁnds that ﬁrms display a high level of rigidity in response to small
shocks, but quick adjustment to large shocks, and that is replicated by our estimated model: the
number of zeros of ∆L following large shocks is substantially larger than that following small
shocks.
19Our estimated model does a good job of matching the Portuguese employment
data. All outcomes are in the ballpark, and, in particular, the model replicates
remarkably well the (employment) action and inaction distributions of the estab-
lishments.
The model shows that the extreme rigidity of employment outcomes in the
Portuguese labor market should be attributed to adjustment costs. We ﬁnd that
diﬀerent types of adjustment costs together take over 5% out of the value of the
ﬁrm. Interestingly, eliminating ﬁxed adjustment costs, while producing moderate
gains in term of the value of ﬁrm, induces very large changes in the behaviour
of labor demand. This may suggest that employment protection, as measured
by adjustment costs generating low worker ﬂows, can be achieved at a fairly small
economic cost. If this trade-oﬀ is indeed feasible, it may help to explain why there is
such disparity regarding employment protection institutional arrangements among
developed countries.
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